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Abstract
Several concrete examples in quantum information are discussed
to demonstrate the importance of proper modeling that relates the
mathematical description to real-world applications. In particular, it
is shown that some commonly accepted conclusions are not adequately
supported by their purported justifications in the logical manner re-
quired.
1 Introduction
This paper describes the major part of my talk at the 2006 QCMC meeting.
(The rest on unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment are included in
my writeup in this volume for my poster paper.) It may be viewed as a con-
crete elaboration of my points on the role of mathematical modeling and rigor
in real-world applications discussed in [1] and [2]. In the context of quantum
information, such consideration is especially important and indispensable, if
we ever want to develop a true quantum information technology. There are
three main points in the following that are presented in three sections:
1
(i) Entropy or mutual information that the attacker possesses on a gen-
erated key is not a good quantitative measure of security in real cryp-
tosystems.
(ii) Given the entropy criterion, there is no security proof, unconditional
or just limited ones that include all currently feasible attacks, for any
experimental BB84 system.
(iii) Loss is a major limiting factor on many quantum information systems
that has not been properly dealt with theoretically.
These assertions may appear startling to many, as they are contrary to
the “accepted opinion”, if I may say, of much of the quantum information
community. However, at this point of writing, I believe they are incontro-
vertible truths. I hope this is substantiated in the following.
2 Performance Criteria and Security Guar-
antee
Let us consider the issue of security measure on the generated key Kg in a
quantum key generation (QKG) system. Eve’s Shannon entropy HE(Kg),
or equivalently her mutual information IE = |Kg| − HE(Kg), is the most
commonly used measure. If Eve’s knowledge of Kg is bit by bit, the binary
entropy of a bit is in one-one correspondence with Eve’s bit error rate. How-
ever, in general Eve has bit-correlated information on Kg, and we may ask:
What is the concrete security guarantee provided by having IE ≤ ǫ for a given
level ǫ? The problem arises because IE or HE is a theoretical quantity with
no operational meaning automatically attached. In standard cryptography,
this issue does not arise because fresh key generation is considered impos-
sible [3-5] and was never attempted, while security of other cryptographic
functions is based on computational complexity.
In ordinary communications, the operational significance of the entropic
quantities is given through the Shannon source and channel coding theorems,
which relate them to the empirical quantities of data rate and error rate.
But what is the corresponding empirical security guarantee in cryptography?
This issue was not addressed by Shannon in his classic cryptography paper
written at about the same time as his classic information and communication
theory papers. It was not addressed by anybody else since.
2
It is clear that entropy is just a one-number representation of a whole
probability distribution. All questions of security could be answered by know-
ing the complete distribution, which I would like to call Eve’s error profile.
Let pi = pE(Kg|Y ESE), where Kg is an n-bit string, Y E is Eve’s observation,
SE is her total side information, be ordered p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pN , N = 2n. Thus, p1
is Eve’s maximum probability of guessing Kg correctly with her information.
As a one-number representation of pi, p1 is of special importance because
it must be sufficiently small for a meaningful security guarantee. Even for
moderate |Kg| ∼ 102 − 103, it appears that p1 ∼ 2−20 may not be small
enough for many applications, while p1 ∼ 2−10 would be a disastrous breach
of security.
Generally, if Eve can try m different possible Kg to break the cryptosys-
tem, the first m pi are the relevant numbers to determine any quantitative
level of security. For N possible trials, the trial complexity Ct =
∑N
i=1 i · pi
which is the average number of trials Eve needs to succeed, is a meaningful
measure of security. The number p1 itself is operationally meaningful, and is
in fact the most suitable measure if a single number has to be used in lieu of
the whole pi.
To illustrate this and the problem of IE, we observe that given p1 ≤ 2−l
for some l, we have Ct ≥ (2l + 1)/2 and IE ≤ n− l [3]. In the worst case pi,
one has [3],
p1 ∼ 2−l for IE/n ∼ 2−l. (1)
Thus, if Eve has 10−3 bit of information per bit of Kg, it is possible that her
p1 ∼ 2−10. This possibility arises from the possible correlation between the
bits of Kg that is reflected in Eve’s information on the whole Kg. The pi
that gives one deterministic bit of information to Eve out of |Kg| = 103 in
the above example is the best, not the worst case, for the users. It is not a
meaningful procedure to average Eve’s p1 or other measure over the possible
pi given a fixed level of IE , because there is a definite pi that Eve has for the
given cryptosystem.
Thus, to ensure proper security via IE , one must have l sufficiently small
in IE/n ∼ 2−l. It is difficult to ensure exponentially small IE in an entropic
analysis of an experimental system. In fact, IE/n ∼ 2−10 is considered very
good in current experimental BB84 schemes, with 0.1% information leak
per bit after error correction and privacy amplification [6]. But as analyzed
above, this does not rule out the possibility of a disastrous breach of secu-
rity. This exponential problem persists if the Kolmogorov distance δ(p, p0)
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between pi and the uniform distribution p
0 is used in lieu of IE .
It is possible to use privacy amplification algorithms to guarantee expo-
nentially small IE , but the known result [7] from Reny´ı entropy is always
loose by a factor of 2 in the exponent for bounding p1. In addition, Reny´ı
entropy is difficult to deal with quantitatively. There is no example in quan-
tum cryptography in which it has been usefully bounded in the finite n case,
other than the i.i.d. situation which does not cover all the currently feasible
attacks. On the other hand, many theoretical results in information and
communication theory yield directly the exponential behavior of p1. In this
connection, it is important to observe that l = log p1 is the true limit on
the number of fresh key bits generated in a QKG or classical key generation
system. Thus, I recommend that p1 be employed as the security measure in
both theoretical and experimental cryptosystem studies.
Here I would like to mention the following problem of BB84: Since Eve
can break the system completely by a man-in-the-middle attack if she guesses
correctly the message authentication key Km needed for the public channel,
what is the meaning that a much longer fresh key than |Km| is still generated?
3 BB84 Security Proofs
The assertion I would like to make now is that no complete QKG protocol
has been given with quantified security level that is proved unconditionally
secure in a realistic setting including inevitable loss and noise. By a complete
protocol I mean one which has all the steps specified that can be implemented
in a real system and which goes all the way to yield a final generated key Kg
that has proven security, say IE ≤ ǫ for a fixed security level ǫ. Such a com-
plete protocol is needed by an experimentalist to implement a cryptosystem
with quantified security, granting here that IE is used as a security measure.
Such a quantified “secure” cryptosystem is what we need to produce to sub-
stantiate the claim that we have a “secure” QKG system while there is no
comparable provenly secure classical cryptosystem.
This requirement implies that all asymptotic analysis and random cod-
ing existence proofs with no finite code specified are not sufficient for a real
cryptosystem that always has a finite bit length and that requires explicitly
specified protocol steps. Indeed, even if a code is specified, it is not “real-
istic” when the decoding cannot be carried out in polynomial time. This is
especially the case in view of the fact, to be shown elsewhere, that exponen-
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tial inefficiency can be utilized to generate fresh key via exponentially small
probability of success.
There are as yet only two papers with unconditional security claim on
the finite realistic protocols presented that include the effect of noise. In [8],
the code is not specified and it is not clear if a code, especially one with
polynomial-time decoding algorithm, can be found in a typical experimen-
tal parameter region. In [9], the final quantitative result is derived under
approximation without rigorous bounds. Both [8] and [9] do not include all
possible attacks in a system with transmission loss, as is the case for every
security proof given thus far.
The typical loss of linear attenuation is inevitable and usually consider-
able in an optical system. Its effect on the security of BB84 or Ekert type
cryptosystem has never been rigorously determined, while it is accepted by
many in the “community” that it only affects the throughput of a single-
photon BB84 system but not its security. That this has not been established
by a proper analysis is readily seen from the fact that the qubit model is not
applicable to the situation where the transmission medium is lossy. If only
the detector is lossy, but Eve is assumed not able to manipulate it, a good
assumption in most cases, the qubit model holds for transmission. If the
line is lossy, and Eve is assumed capable of introducing an alternative loss-
less medium, there are additional attacks she could launch on single-photon
BB84 similar to the case of coherent-state or multi-photon BB84. Even at
the individual attack level, she could launch an approximate probabilistic
cloning attack similar to the unambiguous state discrimination attack in the
multi-photon case.
With probabilistic cloning, it is possible to clone nonorthogonal linearly
independent states with a nonzero, and of course nonunity, probability [10].
Similarly, it may be possible to approximately n-clone any set of states with a
nonzero probability and fidelity larger that that obtainable with unity prob-
ability. This possibility has been explicitly demonstrated [11]. By adjusting
the probability of success for a given loss level, Eve could launch such an at-
tack on single-photon BB84 without being detected. If the resulting fidelity
in a 2-clone is higher, Eve’s attack becomes more powerful in the lossy case.
This possibility has not been analyzed in the literature, although for
individual attacks it can be shown that the fidelity cannot be increased in
this way [12]. However, this already shows that a 3-level model of a qubit
in loss is necessary to represent the physical situation, so that all possible
attacks by Eve are accounted for in a joint attack. Actually, an infinite-
5
dimensional multimode model should be used. This analysis is currently
lacking. In particular, the use of decoy states [13] in multi-photon BB84 in
loss does not solve the security problem of such sources in loss, because at
best the problem of single-photon BB84 in loss remains.
Actually, I believe there are several problems in the current proofs of BB84
security that make the validity of various arguments quite questionable. They
will be addressed elsewhere. A lot of these problems center around the issue of
how one may be able to make rigorous assertions on a multi-correlated system
by examining just one copy. It also appears to me that only symmetrized
joint attacks are included in the current proofs. It has not been shown why
unsymmetrical attacks, especially adaptive ones, could not do better. These
problems disappear in the case of individual attacks. However, for such
attack, the problem of fully accounting for the side information that can be
exploited in just collective classical processing is difficult, and many errors
on this issue in the literature can be found [14]. On the other hand, there
is no such problem in the KCQ (Keyed Communication in Quantum Noise)
approach [3, 15].
Note added: The issues of Sections 2 and 3 are being addressed by
M. Hayashi and applied to the experiment of A. Tomita. The security and
efficiency analysis of BB84 including especially message authentication will
be presented by our group shortly.
4 Loss in Quantum Metrology and Quantum
Computation
Loss is a major limiting factor on the quantum effects obtainable in a physical
system, which is well-known in quantum optics in the case of squeezing [16]
and especially superposition of “macroscopic states” [17, 18]. Recently, it has
been proposed that the NOON state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|N〉|0〉+ |0〉|N〉) for number
state |N〉 could lead to improved interferometric measurements with , e.g., a
phase resolution ∆φ ∼ 1/N instead of the ∼ 1/√N obtained with coherent
states. They would find many applications under the heading of “quantum
metrology”. Actually, squeezed states alone on a single mode would lead
to such improvement without entanglement, which is the optimum value
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obtainable for a fixed N [16]. Also, the state
|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|N〉|N − 1〉+ |N − 1〉|N〉) (2)
leads to similar improvement [19] as the NOON state |ψ〉, and can be more
closely generated by optical parametric processes.
Superposition of macroscopic states is “supersensitive” to loss. I have
re-emphasized the significance of this phenomenon in quantum information
[2, 20]. Consider the state 1√
2
(|n1〉|n2〉+ |n2〉|n1〉) for number states |n〉, with
ρ the corresponding density operator. Let ρ′ be the incoherent superposition
ρ′ = 1
2
(|n1〉|n2〉〈n1|〈n2| + |n2〉|n1〉〈n2|〈n1|). If the system is in typical linear
loss with transmittance η, it is readily computed that the trace distance is
[20]
‖ρ− ρ′‖1 = 2ηn1+n2. (3)
Thus, for large n1 + n2, ‖ρ − ρ′‖1 ∼ 2e−1 and the system effectively deco-
heres with the loss of one photon. For a large N NOON state, a fractional
loss of 1/N would already destroy the quantum effect responsible for the ∆φ
improvement. Furthermore, (3) shows qualitatively that the entanglement
effect responsible for the improvement of any usual performance criterion is
wiped out with a tiny loss. This should remain true for any other entangle-
ment of macroscopic states. The coherent state case is also worked out in
ref. [20].
I believe a similar supersensitivity obtains in a long multi-qubit entangle-
ment for quantum computation, which cannot be removed by fault-tolerant
quantum computing or “quantum leak plumbing”. The reason is that the
terms in a long superposition of many qubits also contain many quanta, which
would become supersensitive in the presence of loss similar to the NOON
state. The situation cannot be rectified by fault-tolerant qubits which are
themselves lossy. Also, quantum leak plumbing disturbs the system in an
unpredictable way even if no leak is found. To my knowledge, this whole
issue has not been properly treated theoretically in the literature. While
linear loss is significant in all current experimental quantum computation
schemes, there are many other theoretical schemes in which such loss can be
made negligible. However, the moral I would like to draw here is that we
should incorporate all the small but perhaps ultimately significant pertur-
bations in the theoretical study of quantum information systems, and one
should not believe that a system would do what it is designed for without
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such perturbations and small details fully taken into account in the system
model.
5 Conclusion
There is currently a huge divide between theory and experiment on quantum
information systems, even just on a small scale. I believe this arises also from
inadequate modeling of the system as in the large scale case discussed above.
In cryptography, there is the further complication that security guarantee
has to be obtained with mathematical rigor, assuming the model is complete
and correct. It is possible to show that a cryptosystem is insecure by an
experiment or a simulation, but it is not possible to prove a cryptosystem
secure by such means or by other qualitative reasoning. This point I made in
[1] comes in full force for security guarantee. We should be extra careful in
our modeling and proofs of quantum cryptographic systems. Finally, there is
the question whether any useful concrete system can be built for a realistic
application if it is so model-sensitive as in the BB84 case, an issue we have
not discussed but is widely known.
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